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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 08/07/2011 Accident number: 718 
Accident time: 09:30 Accident Date: 22/06/2010 
Where it occurred: AF/0101/00096, 
MF0874, Waisalabad 
area, Ward-07, Kabul 
City 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 08/07/2010 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast Ground condition: rocks/stones 
steep slope 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 08/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
1 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] MDG-09 DMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION:  
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Kabul to investigate the demining accident 
involving [the Victim] the deminer of [Demining group] MDG-09. The accident occurred at 
09:30 hours, 22 June 2010 in Task # AF/0101/00096/MF 0874 located in Waisalabad area, 
Ward-07 of Kabul City.  
SUMMARY: 
Task # AF/0101/00096/MF 0874 is located in a mountainous area contaminated with anti-
personnel mines planted by Russian forces. The area is mined several times after the 
Russian withdrawal up to the end of internal conflict. This area is recorded by LIS under the 
community No. 096 then confirmed by LIAT in 2008. Around 12 accidents have been 
occurred on locals in mentioned area. 
As per the request of local people, AMAC Central tasked MDG-09 of [Demining group] on 
15th May 2010, to start clearance operation there. Total size of the task is 44515 m2 out of 
which 34500 m2 has been cleared so far, 12 AP PMN2 mines and 329 different types of ERW 
found/destroyed by MDG-09 up to the accident time. 
The accident occurred on 22 June 2010, 09:30 AM in clearance lane of [the Victim], located in 
a steep sloping area within the MF. He was busy in full excavation there, suddenly some 
stones and soil slipped down in front of him and caused a PMN2 mine to go off. The ground 
where [the Victim] was working was of a loose and sliding nature, so it slipped down and 
directly hit the mine and caused the accident. So this was an unpreventable accident in 
nature, but as it seems from the location and severity of injuries, the visor was not used 
properly during the operation. Although he got some injuries on his face and shoulders, but 
the victim deminer was finally evacuated to Pakistan for the treatment of his eyes injuries. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The investigation team concluded that the poor supervision and carelessness of victim 
deminer are the main factors for this accident and eye injuries. As it seems the visor was not 
used properly by the deminer during the operations, but he was permitted to continue 
operation without being controlled by the command group of MDG-09.  
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The following points are to be considered: 
• Inappropriate use of visor resulted in severe injuries to the eyes and face of involved 
de-miner, therefore all the command group are strongly recommended to reinforce 
their focus to this point and never allow their de-miners to use the PPE 
inappropriately. 
• Working in such complicated areas requires strict control of command group, 
especially the section leaders should pay more attention and control their deminers 
and stop them when working in contrary to standards.  
• [Demining group] operations department is recommended to develop a plan for the 
improvement of supervision, command and control in their teams.   
Feedback on any preventive and constructive actions taken by [Demining group] is required 




Victim number: 910 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Shoulders; severe Eyes; severe Face 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim 
was working with his visor raised (or removed) and his error was not corrected. The 
investigators recognised the lack of control and urged the group’s management to improve 
command and control, so the secondary cause is listed as a Management Control 
Inadequacy. 
Because the Victim also has “shoulder injuries”, it is not clear whether he was wearing any 
body protection. The absence of hand injuries implies that the Victim did not detonate the 
mine with a hand-tool so the rocks slipping in front of him may have been the real cause of 
the detonation. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have 
been more responsible than the internationals with overall responsibility. 
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